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CORKSCREW SANCTUARY: USE OF THE MARKET 
FOR PRESERVATION 
By Barbara Jo Ingle* 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICT 
The phrase "development vs. preservation", often used rhetori-
cally by concerned interest groups of either persuasion, has served 
to obscure rather than clarify the real issues involved in land-use 
planning. Once demand for preservation has been established, as 
shown by a willingness to payor by political action on the part of 
those who would benefit from preservation, the issue is no longer 
"preservation or development;" it becomes "how much preserva-
tion" and "what kind of development." From a regional perspective 
the two land-uses are not mutually exclusive. The problem becomes 
one of balancing the allocation of land as between the two uses, not 
only in terms of the provision of an adequate quantity and quality 
of parks and sanctuaries, but in the continued maintenance of pre-
served and developed lands. The task is by no means easy. Normally 
the market would distribute resources among land-uses according to 
the dictates of the citizenry voting its preference through the rela-
tive prices offered for the product of each type of land-use. But, as 
we shall see, the collective goods nature of the parks and sanctuaries 
make prices for the "products" of this land-use indeterminate, and 
value comparisons between developed and preserved lands difficult. 
A. The Gulf American - Corkscrew Sanctuary Conflict 
The National Audubon Society, owner and manager of Corkscrew 
Swamp Sanctuary in Collier County, Florida, is currently involved 
in a conflict over "how much preservation" and "what kind of devel-
opment" with the General Acceptance Corporation, owners of the 
Golden Gate and North Golden Gate Estates developments of the 
same county. This situation exemplifies in small scale the larger 
problems society faces in determining some balance in the alloca-
tion of resources between preservation and development. The pur-
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pose of this article is to explore the conflict and to structure the 
problem of allocation with application of economic welfare theory 
models of collective consumption goods and external effects. These 
models should clarify the problems and reveal the cultural, institu-
tional and legal constraints, as well as the collective goods problems, 
which inhibit effective market resolution of these conflicts. It is 
demonstrated that, while the Gulf American - Corkscrew Sanctuary 
conflict exhibits classic economic characteristics of market failure, 
these. characteristics, as discussed in Sections II, III and IV, do not 
fully explain the almost complete lack of market-type resolution of 
the conflict, as by bargaining between the conflicting parties. Ulti-
mately, as demonstrated in Section V, it is the legal institutional 
context in which the market operates which must be adjusted so 
that resources may be allocated in the most efficient' and equitable 
manner. 
The conflict is the result of incompatible water management poli-
cies. Gulf American Land Corporation (which sold out to General 
Acceptance Corporation in 1968) drained its land by means of an 
extensive system of ditches and canals in order to develop the 
Golden Gate and North Golden Gate Estates. This development is 
located just south of Corkscrew Swamp Sanctuary. The canals facil-
itated rapid runoff after heavy rains and lowered the water table 
sufficiently to allow for heavy construction and the installation of 
sewage facilities. This drainage had an impact on areas owned by 
others. The management of the Sanctuary believes that the canal 
system's zone of influence extends into the Sanctuary, lowering its 
water table, making the land "more fit for pine than for cypress 
swamp and grass marsh."2 Since the value of the Sanctuary to its 
owners and to all other beneficiaries represented by the owners is 
principally derived from (1) its great virgin bald cypress strand, the 
largest remaining stand in the country, and (2) the swamp and 
marsh as habitat for the wood stork and many other rare and beauti-
ful flora and fauna; any influence which changes the flora and 
fauna, or increases the probability of habitat destruction (as by fire) 
reduces the value of the Sanctuary. 
The management of the Sanctuary believes that the drainage has 
served to exacerbate both the effects of seasonal dry periods,3 thus 
encouraging the encroachment of dry land vegetation such as the 
wax myrtle and the coastal willow, and the effects of periodic 
drought, by lowering the water table to such an extent that the 
underlying peat formations, normally conserving water, dry out and 
radically increase the destructive potential of fire. (Fire travels un-
derground through dry peat layers, flaring as much as a mile from 
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its initial location. The fires also tend to last longer, smoldering for 
long periods below ground.)4 Unfortunately, since water-table depth 
gauges have not been in place long enough to establish average 
levels under various weather conditions, it is difficult to prove that 
the alleged effect really exists. 
Since the canal system has been constructed, the National Audu-
bon Society has acted under the assumption that the canals, as 
installed by Gulf American and extended by the General Accept-
ance Corporation, have lowered Sanctuary water tables. The canals 
were constructed during an unusual series of drought years, which 
brought numerous fire threats to the Sanctuary. In June of 1962, fire 
invaded the southern portion of the Sanctuary, burning three 
hundred acres. The drought and fire threats stimulated internal 
National Audubon Society proposals for diking and heavy pumping 
from wells in order to retain and replenish surface water, but no 
action was taken until after the canals were dug. It is uncertain from 
the records whether the projects would have been undertaken in the 
absence of the canals, but it is certain that the existence of the 
canals imparted an air of urgency to the proposals. In solicitations 
fQl' contributions, the Society stressed the impact of the develop-
ment as the factor responsible for the threat: 
. . . . . the Society reported the successful completion last month of a 
two-year fund-raising campaign for $696,000 to rescue its famed Cork-
screw Swamp Sanctuary from death by man-made drought. The money 
was used to pay for 2680 acres that had to be bought to prevent land-
development and drainage from siphoning off the water that sustains 
the swamp ecology, including the nation's largest surviving stand of 
virgin bald cypress.5 
B. The Sanctuary in a Development Context 
Corkscrew Sanctuary was created in 1954 in response to heavy 
pressure to cut over this last large remaining stand of cypress in the 
nation. Once the threatened tracts of land came under the owner-
ship of a preservation group, they were considered "saved". But 
preservation is a full-time occupation, as later events were to show. 
It appeared in 1954 that the Sanctuary was distant enough from 
Naples and Ft. Myers, the two nearest major population centers, so 
that no danger from development threatened.6 The seasonally 
flooded lands appeared to be economically unappealing. The only 
protection deemed necessary was by wardens against poachers. 
But Collier County has been experiencing the "explosive" growth 
rate characteristic of South Florida.7 The business of developing a 
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frontier to accommodate this explosion has literally transfigured the 
County. 
Mangrove islands and coastal areas were cut over, dredged, and 
filled to provide room for those who came to reside, rest, and re-
create on the Gulf. Wet prairies just back of the narrow coastal strip 
in settled areas were filled to support roads, condominiums, houses, 
commercial activities, municipal buildings. This construction re-
quired lumber extracted from the interior of the County, trans-
ported on dredged and filled roads and railroads. Cypress strands 
were denuded of cypress and royal palm. Broad sections of the inte-
rior were drained, razed, and cultivated for truck farm products, 
converted to pasture, or planted with seedlings for pulpwood pine. 
Settlements expanded to service the truck farm interests; razing, 
draining and filling were necessary. A transportation network both 
stimulated and was made necessary by the tourists coming cross-
country, and the truck farm products, great cypress logs, and pine 
being exported to national distribution centers. 
The Sanctuary found itself becoming an island of wilderness in 
northern Collier County. As the value of farm products increased, 
marginal land was "improved", or razed and ditched to provide for 
rapid runoff, then irrigated. In the beginning, these practices were 
compatible with the existence of the Sanctuary. With time, as ex-
tensive ditching to the north and east began to cut into the Sanc-
tuary's water supply, and as intensive use offertilizer and pesticides 
began to pollute and enrich the water finding its way into the Cork-
screw Swamp, the management of the Sanctuary began to worry 
about farming practices. 
The following quotes from an internal Society report prepared in 
1964 illustrate the National Audubon Society's awareness of the 
pressures of development surrounding the Sanctuary. 
Although acquired as recently as 1954, the coincidence of several new 
socio-economic factors has already - in 1964 - so altered conditions 
affecting the Corkscrew Swamp Sanctuary that the future of this gem 
in the National Audubon Society's chain of wildlife sanctuaries is ten-
uous unless an aggressive program of water rights acquisition is imple-
mented soon .... 
Actually, housing developments are currently less serious a threat 
than agricultural development. Already, sugar cane fields have been 
implanted in the wetlands between Corkscrew and Immokalee, and one 
section of land in Corkscrew Marsh south of Little Corkscrew Island has 
been developed for truck farming. This last development, begun in 1963 
and still expanding, has already sealed off the southern arm of Cork-
screw Marsh. If a like development were implanted on the marsh north 
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of Little Corkscrew Island, the flow of its life-giving waters to Corkscrew 
Swamp would be effectively cut off, since Corkscrew Marsh would then 
be drained southeastward, and well away from Corkscrew Swamp.s 
In sum, the Sanctuary, by 1964, and increasingly so in the years 
since, has found itself pressed on all sides by agricultural and resi-
dential development. Both types of development have been encour-
aged by a County government pleased to see the County growing in 
those years. 
II. THE SANCTUARY AND COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION GOODS 
Land preserved as sanctuary is not, in the usual sense, an input 
for the production of goods and services which can be properly 
priced on the open market. The land comprising the Golden Gate 
Estates, as a contrasting example, has been in turn a resource input 
for timber, food products, and houses and services supplying an 
annual rent. Each product brought a determinate market price, 
thereby conferring a price on the land itself consisting of the dis-
counted net value of current and future goods and services. 
A. Pure Market Provision 
The output of a sanctuary may be described as services. Among 
these are: interest aroused by the display of curious and beautiful 
flora and fauna, the feeling or peace and awe produced by the tower-
ing cypress, and the spectacle of hundreds of nesting woodstorks. 
Admittedly these services are almost undefinable. Nevertheless, 
however defined, the sanctuary does provide something the people 
want and are (potentially) willing to pay for. A perceptible demand 
for preserved areas and a ready, though diminishing, source of sup-
ply of natural areas do exist. 
Sanctuary goods and services, however, are not priced; as a conse-
quence no market value for use or preservation can be attached to 
the land. Therefore, the market fails to properly allocate resources 
as between preservation and other forms of land-use. The problem 
lies in the collective consumption characteristics of the services pro-
duced by the Sanctuary. 
1. Collective Consumption Characteristics 
A pure collective consumption good, by Samuelson's definition, 
is one which "all enjoy in common in the sense that each individ-
ual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any 
other individual's consumption of that good."B The most commonly 
cited example is that of national defense, of which all citizens par-
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take equally, and from which no citizen can be excluded. A pure 
private good, on the other hand, would be one which, when con-
sumed by one individual, is to that degree not available for con-
sumption by any other. It is helpful to think of these as characteris-
tics. Most goods fall along a spectrum bounded by these polar char-
acteristics. 
A sanctuary has strong collective consumption characteristics. lo 
"Consumption" of a sanctuary will be defined here as non-
destructive appreciation of the aesthetic, recreational, or cultural 
values of a sanctuary. The following are ways of using, or consum-
ing, a sanctuary: 
Visitation of a sanctuary is the most obvious consumptive use. Up 
to capacity, defined as the point where a certain number of occu-
pants precludes visitation by the marginal visitor, the sanctuary 
exhibits pure collective consumption characteristics; that is, each 
consumer has available the same sanctuary for enjoyment, and his 
consumption does not limit the consumption of the next visitor. 
After that point, congestion introduces some aspects of exclusion. 
Off-site benefits are pure collective consumption benefits. Those 
who appreciate the value of the existence of a sanctuary, as through 
the mass media, or those whose enjoyment arises out of anticipation 
of future use do not exclude use by any other citizen. Off-site bene-
fits include the satisfaction (and willingness to pay) felt by some 
persons that their heirs will have the opportunity to enjoy the sanc-
tuary. 
The wildlife which use the sanctuary as breeding grounds or as 
resting and feeding places are resources, in part produced by the 
sanctuary, which exhibit collective consumption good characteris-
tics. A vee of geese wending northward in early spring may be en-
joyed by each citizen along the flyway without the exclusion of any 
other citizen's enjoyment. 
The sanctuary may also provide educational and scientific 
interests, each of which exhibits collective consumption good char-
acteristics. As with each of the other uses, as development proceeds 
and sanctuaries become remnants of natural environments, the his-
toric value of sanctuaries for education and science will increase, 
possibly dramatically. I I 
For an understanding of the way in which collective consumption 
characteristics can frustrate the pricing mechanism, a stricter defi-
nition, again following Samuelson,12 will be helpful. 
In the case of a pure private good, total consumption is equal to 
the sum of each individual's consumption: 
X total = XI X2 + X3 + . . . . + X n 
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Each individual's consumption excludes consumption by any 
other. For any given quantity of output of the good there will be a 
corresponding price which all consumers pay for each unit con-
sumed. 
For a collective consumption good, on the other hand, if X total 
equals the quantity of the collective good available for consumption, 
(keeping quality constant) and XI, X2, X3, ... xn equal the re-
spective individual consumption of consumers 1, 2, 3 ... n, then: 
X total = XI = X2 = X3. . . = X n 
or each consumer has available the whole amount of the good, and 
each has available the same amount. There is no exclusion by one 
consumer of another. 
For any quantity of the collective good the demand schedule will 
show not a common price to each consumer, but the sum of the 
willingness-to-pay for all consumers. Note that each consumer's 
willingness-to-pay may be different; there is no common price. This 
is what is meant when a collective consumption good is called a non-
priced good. 
The market works with prices. Bidding and counter-bidding by 
consumers for exclusive consumption goods determines the demand 
schedule, which, at its intersection with the supply schedule, deter-
mines equilibrium prices and quantity of that private good.13 
2. The Free-Rider Effect and Transactions Costs 
This is not so with collective consumption goods. Since goods are 
not exclusive, there is little or no motivation to bid against other 
potential consumers. This built-in lack of motivation is termed the 
free-rider effect. Because the individual consumer is able to benefit 
from the existence of a collective consumption good whether or not 
he contributes his willingness-to-pay, and because his contribution 
would have an almost negligible effect, rational self-interest would 
dictate that he understate his willingness-to-pay, or pay not at all. 
If all consumers were motivated in this manner to let others carry 
the burden, since each would collect the fruits of others' invest-
ments, there would be no market for the collective consumption 
good. In reality, some consumers will bid for some collective goods, 
so that a small private market may form. The demand schedule will 
still not reflect the willingness-to-pay of all those who "ride-free." 
The free-rider effect multiplies the costs of transacting bargains 
between the conflicting parties. A definition of such costs is as fol-
lows: 
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Restricting the methods of conflict resolution to bargaining, 
transactions costs, T, consist of three categories: Tl, the initial costs 
leading to negotiations between the two groups; T2, the costs of main-
taining and, if necessary, revising, the agreement; and T3, the capital 
expenditure, if any, required to implement the agreement. 
The most important of these, the Tl costs, can be broken down, for 
each group, into a number of phases: (a) identifying the members of the 
group; (b) persuading them to make, or to accept, a joint offer; (c) 
reaching agreement within the group on all matters incidental to its 
negotiation with the other group; and (d) negotiating with the other 
group. 14 
Transactions costs exist for any market transaction, for private or 
collective goods, but are normally higher for collective consumption 
goods. The free-rider effect will tend to increase Tl costs by an 
amount in direct proportion to the number of individuals collec-
tively affected. Since, after a point, the Tl costs of soliciting the 
marginal contribution will exceed the amount of that contribution, 
there is a built-in damper effect operating on any individual or 
group effort to collect funds sufficient to provide a sanctuary. And, 
of course, the transactions costs are a resource cost as valid as the 
cost of the land itself, to be weighed against the total benefits pro-
vided by the proposed sanctuary. 
3. Time as a Factor 
Time is a critical factor in the provision of sanctuaries. Sanctu-
aries are generally provided in order to prevent the threatened ex-
tinction of flora, fauna, or ecosystems. If these latter are currently 
common, marginal value of the habitat acreage as sanctuary may 
be low. When the total quantity of that particular type of habitat 
diminishes, due to development, or when external effects such as 
water pollution or noise from development begin to encroach upon 
the quality of remaining habitat, the value of habitat acreage rises. 
But general appreciation of the scarcity value is often slow to grow 
so that the habitat is lost, or almost lost, before enough individuals 
exhibit sufficient willingness-to-pay to have the remaining land set 
aside. By that time, the choice habitats may be gone, or the quant-
ity may be small, or too dispersed to support active flora and fauna. 
The same problem arises with inter-generational demand shifts. 
Just as this generation regrets the loss of the passenger pigeon, and 
would surely be willing to pay for its rejuvenation, succeeding gener-
ations may value habitats for which demand today is nil. Tastes 
change from one generation to the next; by developing land and 
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irrevocably destroying natural areas today we reduce the set of 
choices available to the next generation. 
The provision and maintenance of sanctuaries requires foresight. 
In both cases those in a position to supply or help supply land 
suitable for sanctuaries must be able to perceive not only which 
habitats will become valuable, whether through scarcity or a change 
in taste, but how much land for sanctuary and buffer zone will 
sufficiently satisfy future expected demand. 
As we shall see, despite the high transactions costs and the factor 
of time, the market operates to privately allocate some land and 
resources to sanctuary use, although, of course, because the market 
cannot properly handle collective consumption goods, allocative 
choices between development and sanctuary land use have tradi-
tionally been biased toward the former. 
B. Public Provision 
When the market fails to properly allocate resources, public pro-
vision of goods exhibiting strong collective consumption characteris-
tics with a palpable, if unexpressed, demand is a viable alternative. 
And, in fact, we do see that the government has allocated tax mon-
ies to the provision of some sanctuaries, especially where public 
demand was so strong as to be influential to political decision-
makers. (This may be simply a case where a few powerful or influen-
tial persons preferred a sanctuary, or where a multitude clamored 
loud enough to attract the attention of influential political figures.) 
But the government confronts many of the same problems plaguing 
efficient market allocation, and a few others as well. 
Information about demand and the state of supply is necessary 
for decision-makers to allocate resources. Freemanl5 demonstrates 
how the advocacy process, wherein opposing interest groups try to 
persuade decision-makers, can supply information, or alternative 
standards and criteria, with which a decision not purely arbitrary 
can be reached. The decision-maker's forum for advocacy functions 
best when it generates (1) information, for example about endan-
gered species and trade-offs between development and preservation, 
and (2) an objective function, which should be a composite and 
compromise between advocates pressing different standards and 
criteria for value. 
The government is faced with the problem of translating and 
summing willingness-to-pay, then equitably distributing costs 
among the beneficiaries. The pure theory of public expenditure, 
according to Samuelson,16 as paraphrased by Steiner, 17 is that "since 
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demands of different individuals for a collective good are comple-
mentary rather than competitive we can add the willingness-to-pay 
of different individuals and if the aggregate sum exceeds the costs, 
the good is worth producing." The government must, in the case of 
sanctuaries, depend upon advocacy to give some estimate of de-
mand, rather than a national census of willingness-to-pay for sanc-
tuaries, because voters are rarely, if ever, given an explicit choice. IS 
The government, too, must deal with the time lags of demand 
formation and the trade-off between present and future generations' 
demands. However, part of the responsibility of the government is 
to prepare for the future, so it should have more flexibility with 
respect to these issues than the market, which is subject to individ-
ual myopia. Alternatively, as the collective conscience of the popu-
lace, it is also the responsibility of the government to overcome the 
individual self-interest upon which the market depends. 
C. The Quasi-Public Preservation Group 
1. A Definition 
The provision of collective goods is not limited to decentralized 
market processes or the government; private organizations may 
arise in response to felt demand for collective goods. Examples in-
clude food co-ops, trade associations, unions, or museums, each 
serving a clientele which is greater than the listed membership con-
sisting of contributors. 
That segment of the public which would benefit from, and exhib-
its some willingness to pay for, preservation in the form of sanctu-
aries is largely indeterminate in size and membership. This segment 
may be described as potential consumers, in a market context, or 
potential advocates where choices are made by administrative 
decision-making. Tangible evidence of the existence of this segment 
lies in the success of non-profit organizations espousing preservation 
interests in acquiring the support of members of this segment. These 
preservation groups exhibit behavior ranging from pure market ac-
tivity, such as purchasing land, to pure state-oriented activity, as a 
lobbying or legal action group. 
An example of the former order is the Nature Conservancy, which 
exists only to purchase land or easements and whose lobbying efforts 
are confined to efforts to minimize taxes on the acquired property 
rights. The Sierra Club, as a group whose efforts are devoted wholly 
to lobbying and working in the judicial process, provides an example 
of the latter. The National Audubon Society exhibits characteristics 
of both; it purchases land for sanctuaries, and lobbies, if not to the 
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government, then to the public-at-Iarge (consistent with its tax ex-
empt status). Preservation groups, then, operate on two fronts: (1) 
they lobby or use the judicial process to influence public efforts to 
preserve land, and (2) they acquire property rights to advance pri-
vate efforts for preservation. These groups are quasi-public groups 
in the sense that, although real membership is private (usually con-
tingent upon a small donation or annual dues), they behave as if 
they represented the entire segment of the public interested in pres-
ervation. 
2. Reduction of Transactions Costs 
Preservation groups partially overcome the causes of improper 
market allocation attributable to collective consumption goods by 
reducing transactions costs. Part of their function is to locate and 
identify all potential beneficiaries of sanctuaries; hence a portion of 
their budgets goes for "advertising" or public relations, which en-
courages potential beneficiaries to make their preferences known, 
and further, to actually join a preservation group. The organizations 
serve these beneficiaries by providing a speaker through which the 
collective voice may be heard, and focused effectively, on specific 
problems. 
The second step is to convert these beneficiaries into benefactors, 
that is, to exact from each individual a contribution approaching his 
willingness-to-pay. While the free-rider effect continues to inhibit 
contributions, the organizations work to neutralize the effect (1) by 
making each contributor feel that his contribution would be signifi-
cant, or by appeal to social conscience, coupled with the more prag-
matic approach that "if you don't, no one else will," and (2) by 
providing some tangible reward which is an exclusive private gain. 
For example, among other services the Nature Conservancy offers 
tax deductions; the National Audubon Society, a magazine; the 
Sierra Club organizes camping privileges, these services going only 
to contributors. In this latter category belongs the practice of re-
stricting access or visitation privileges to contributors. 
Although preservation groups ordinarily work primarily as a 
lobbying or legal force, our concern is with those groups which in 
part or in total use contributions to purchase land or other resources 
in the private sector for preservation as sanctuaries. The following 
section will briefly describe how the groups function in the market. 
3. The Operation of the Preservation Group 
Once a preservation group decides to acquire land (usually land 
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threatened with development), it serves as a source of information 
concerning the opportunity cost of development; that is, it publi-
cizes the environmental losses that would accrue to all beneficiaries 
of the land in its natural state, if the land were developed. It locates 
and identifies sufficient beneficiaries, converts them to benefactors, 
and bargains with development interests, usually on a competitive 
basis. The price the preservation group will offer will always be an 
understatement of its social value because of free-rider effects. The 
property rights for which the preservation group may bargain in-
clude: the land in fee simple, scenic easements or other easements 
which restrict use of the land to development compatible with pres-
ervation, or a leasehold for the life of the freehold owner. The gov-
ernment may, and often does, confer tax advantages on non-profit 
preservation groups, or individuals who donate all or some part of 
the value of their land. Local governments, for example, may forego 
property tax on land preserved in perpetuity. Such aCtion by the 
various levels of government reflect awareness of the collective good 
nature of sanctuaries. 
As development proceeds and intact natural areas diminish in 
area, public recognition of the scarcity value of undisturbed natural 
areas will rise accordingly. The preservation groups serve the neces-
sary function of aggregating and holding land until its value ma-
tures, providing much the same service as do speculators in the 
private markets. The difference remains, however, that the mem-
bers of the preservation groups receive but a very small fraction of 
the full social benefits accruing because of their investment, be-
cause they cannot capture the willingness-to-pay of those who "ride-
free." 
D. The History of the Acquisition of Corkscrew Sanctuary 
The history of the acquisition of Corkscrew Sanctuary will dem-
onstrate how the National Audubon Society acted as a quasi-public 
group in the described manner. 
As logging and development transfigured Collier County, Florida, 
the cougar, alligator, bear, deer, turkey, and smaller game found 
their habitat shrinking and themselves confined by transportation 
corridors. These vital elements of the interior diminished markedly 
in population. The great and lesser plumed birds which nested in 
the cypress strands and fed in the expanses of wet prairies found 
fewer and fewer bald cypress to support their nests, and discovered 
that the wet prairies were diminishing in area and the remainder 
were drying up. Hunters took their toll of each of these species. 
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There existed, both locally and nationally, a number of individu-
als who regretted the destruction of certain of the natural resources 
of Collier County, and who felt that preservation of sections of the 
County constituted a land-use as valid as any other. Speculation, 
however, was forcing land prices to rise rapidly, and none of these 
individuals could offer a price which would purchase enough land 
to be effective as a habitat for the diminishing species. A proposal 
by the National Audubon Society that the State of Florida purchase 
the Sanctuary was rejected. It thus became necessary to mobilize 
collective willingness-to-pay for purchase and maintenance of 
acreage sufficient to provide habitats for the threatened species. 
The National Audubon Society had employed a warden in 1912 to 
protect the birds presumably protected by law. The effort was not 
enough; two wardens were killed by poachers. In the early 30's, 
before logging had made extensive inroads in the Fakahatchee 
Strand, conservation pressure arose to save the royal palms. Princi-
pal landholders in Collier County offered a large section of the Faka-
hatchee Strand to Henry Ford for the relatively low price of 
$2,250,000; Ford, in his turn, proposed that the State accept a gift 
of the land as a park.19 These were depression years in Florida, and 
the State felt financially incapable of maintaining the park, and 
therefore refused to accept it. Taxes on the lands continued, and the 
logging continued. Fakahatchee was entirely cut over for cypress. 
Not until 1954, when the County's last large remaining stand of 
cypress was marked for cutting, did an effective private collective 
organization form to purchase and receive lands to create a sanc-
tuary. Fourteen conservation organizations and numerous individu-
als convened to form the Corkscrew Cypress Rookery Association. 
The National Audubon Society undertook responsibility for acquisi-
tion and management and has since been the principal organization 
through which contributions to Corkscrew were funneled. $170,000 
was raised from private contributors for the specific purpose of pur-
chasing 2,240 acres from Lee Tidewater Cypress Company, which 
gave 640 acres as a gift, and from the Collier Enterprise. By 1957, 
the Sanctuary embraced 5,760 acres; by 1968, 10,087 acres. 
After the organizational meeting on March 20, 1954, in Tampa, 
the Society put out newsletter after newsletter to its constituency, 
and personal letters to principal donors. The appeal for funds was 
made specifically with reference to Corkscrew Sanctuary. Large 
contributions and small were accepted. An ititial purchase of 160 
acres at the heart of the Sanctuary for $25,000 was made with reve-
nues from 206 contributors, of whom 85 were residents of the neigh-
boring towns of Bonita Springs, Ft. Myers, and Naples. Some of the 
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land was leased and bought in stages through 1965.20 
As Section IV will reveal, the Society continued to fund large 
projects for the Sanctuary, as well as additional land acquisitions, 
from contributions solicited for specific purposes, rather than from 
a general fund for sanctuaries. 
This section has shown how the decentralized pricing mechanism 
of the free market will not function properly to allocate resources, 
specifically land, to the provision of sanctuaries, because ofthe free-
rider effect. The State has the power to overcome the free-rider 
effect by taxation, but has essentially the same problems of deter-
mining the efficient quantity of land to devote to the sanctuary 
land-use. In practice, a few very wealthy individuals have created 
sanctuaries open to the public, and the government has acquired 
some land for preservation and prohibited development on other 
lands. The existence of quasi-public groups indicates that neither 
the decentralized market nor the State has provided sanctuaries in 
sufficient quantity. These groups have attributes both of the State 
and the individual, and may act as advocates or as buyers to supple-
ment individual and state provision. Once a sanctuary has been 
acquired, the preservation group continues to function in both 
realms as a proprietor of preserved land and as an advocate for more 
public provision of preserved land. This is necessary because the 
collective consumption characteristics of the sanctuary may inhibit 
effective resolution of conflicts in land-use which crop up after pro-
vision is accomplished. These conflicts, the subject of the next sec-
tion, are the result of external effects. 
III. THE SANCTUARY AND EXTERNAL EFFECTS 
The Sanctuary is a fragment of an ecosystem, a fragment of a land 
tenure system, and a fragment, as we saw in Section I, of an eco-
nomic market system. It is not a closed system; nor can it avoid 
being physically, legally, and economically bound with its neighbors 
and ultimately with other units of larger and more encompassing 
systems. These interdependencies may create conflicts in land-uses, 
where the activity of one property owner inadvertently affects the 
activity of the next. In economic parlance, where the activity of one 
party inadvertently affects the activity of the next, there is said to 
be an external effect. If the effect so produced is felt to be good, then 
it is an external benefit; if bad, then it is an external cost. Although 
defined economically, the external effect, as we shall see, is as much 
a product of the legal-institutional framework of society as it is the 
product of economic relationships. 
CORKSCREW SANCTUARY 661 
As with other land uses, Corkscrew Sanctuary is a potential recip-
ient of several types of external effects, including climatic changes 
brought about by a large-scale change in land cover in South Flor-
ida, pesticide and fertilizer run-off from neighboring farms and 
homesites, noise and activity from increased development bringing 
highways and airports, and incidental dredging and draining of the 
Sanctuary's water supply. The current conflict with the successive 
owners of the Golden Gate and North Golden Gate Estates, a large 
development whose northern extension coincides with the Sanc-
tuary's southern border, is a case in point. This particular conflict 
will be analyzed as a detailed example of the type of pressure that 
will be put upon the Sanctuary. The analysis will suggest why the 
market system has apparently failed to resolve the conflict, and how 
the legal-institutional framework within which the market works 
can be changed to help effect a resolution consistent with societal 
values. 
A. A History of the Conflict 
In 1961, Gulf American acquired by outright purchase and by 
option the lands comprising the Golden Gate and North Golden 
Gate Estates. Razing and drainage operations were begun shortly 
thereafter. By 1964, there were completed, or under construction, 
eleven miles of paved roads and ten miles of canals.21 Collier County 
approved the plans for construction of the canals, which system 
created, in effect, two water drainage districts. Mter construction, 
responsibility for water management was taken over by the County, 
which proposed the establishment of a Collier County Management 
District to include the bulk of the Gulf American canal system and 
the Sanctuary. 
Sanctuary management foresaw the effect of Gulf American 
drainage. 22 No legal action was taken, possibly because the existence 
of the external effect remained unproven. Gulf American disclaimed 
responsibility. The responses of Sanctuary management will be de-
tailed in the following section, but briefly, their response was as 
follows: the National Audubon Society expressed concern and asked 
assistance in resolving the conflict from government officials with-
out avail; the engineering consulting firm, Gee and Jensen, was 
hired to make recommendations concerning drought and drainage; 
negotiations with Gulf American were repeatedly attempted; two 
sections of Gulf American land were purchased at full market price; 
an earthen dike was constructed; seven wells and pumps were con-
structed and supplied with power; a series of fish ponds was built 
to supplement woodstork food supply in drought periods. 
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In early 1969, due to unfavorable publicity resulting from allega-
tions of illegal high pressure sales tactics, misrepresentations, and 
failure to fulfill contractual obligations,23 Gulf American sold out to 
General Acceptance Corporation, which has continued attempting 
to develop the Golden Gate and North Golden Gate Estates. Gen-
eral Acceptance Corporation is one of the world's largest land devel-
opers, with holdings in Florida and Arizona.24 
B. The Conflict as Structured by the External Effects Model 
1. A Definition 
The influence of drainage upon the Sanctuary is a classic case of 
the external effect. The standard economic definition of the external 
effect requires that the effect be non-optional and that it be pro-
duced incidentally and unavoidably in the course of deliberate pro-
duction of other goods and services. Structured by the model of 
external effects, the Gulf American - Corkscrew Sanctuary conflict 
would be as follows: Gulf American Land Corporation, in the course 
of the deliberate production of a development of residential sites, 
constructed a system of canals whose zone of influence extends be-
yond the boundaries of the Golden Gate and North Golden Gate 
Estates, thereby inadvertently draining surface and groundwater 
from Corkscrew Sanctuary. If we assume that the owners of the 
Estates have been employing that extent and depth of the canal 
system which maximizes their profits, then the external effect has 
been unavoidable, and cannot be eliminated without reducing prof-
its. Since the National Audubon Society could not choose to avoid 
the effect without cost to itself, the effect has been non-optional. 
It is a defining characteristic of the external effect that it is not 
mediated by the price system. Since the cost to the Sanctuary was 
not felt by Gulf American, this cost was not taken into account in 
their private profit and loss calculations. Therefore, the external 
effect had no allocative significance; there was no incentive to Gulf 
American to adjust the canal system so as to minimize the external 
effect, since to do so, Gulf American would have had to forego the 
increase in its land value resulting from drainage and/or install 
costly water control devices. In either case, Gulf American would 
have had to suffer reduced profits if it considered costs borne by the 
National Audubon Society as an internal cost of production. 
At this point, one can understand that an external effect is re-
ciprocal. If cost to the Sanctuary is to be avoided, cost must be 
inflicted upon Gulf American Land Corporation. If Gulf American 
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is to escape cost, the beneficiaries of the Sanctuary must bear losses. 
In economic terms, from the perspective of society as a whole, "the 
problem is to avoid the more serious harm."25 
2. Liability 
Although by definition the external effect is reciprocal, in fact one 
party must bear liability. Where the relevant law is absent or am-
biguous, the passive party, i.e. the recipient of the effect, must de 
facto accept liability. In this case, in the absence of adjudication of 
the conflict, liability for the external cost has devolved upon a reluc-
tant National Audubon Society. 
Under certain assumptions (that is, no transactions costs and no 
welfare effect, the assumptions to be relaxed below) the placement 
of liability should have no effect on the economic outcome.26 The 
market working frictionlessly, the liable party should be motivated 
to open negotiations with the other party. For example, if General 
Acceptance Corporation were now found liable for damages caused 
by drainage, then it would be motivated to open negotiations with 
the National Audubon Society in an attempt to find a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of the conflict. The negotiations should in-
volve an exchange of information which would reveal relatively low-
cost alternatives to minimize the external effect. In the absence of 
adjudication, the National Audubon Society has been so motivated 
and has been willing to pay the developers to diminish the effect. 
According to theory, whichever party were liable (that is, whether 
the developer paid the Society to allow them to drain, or whether 
the Society paid the developer to reduce drainage), the total value 
produced by the combined land-uses would be identical. The point 
of the argument is that if there were no barriers to negotiations and 
bargaining, the placement of liability would be irrelevant to the 
general economic welfare of society. 
3. The Transactions Costs 
Practical experience has shown, however, that in the case of envi-
ronmental external effects, which often involve a single firm on one 
hand, and a large number of individuals collectively consuming the 
external effect on the other, neither of the above assumptions holds. 
Since transactions costs differ, depending upon liability rules, the 
total value of production under one set of rules may be greater than 
under another. For example, because the free-rider effect operates 
for beneficiaries of the Sanctuary, the Tl transactions costs of locat-
ing and identifying beneficiaries and soliciting contributions from 
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them should be higher for the National Audubon Society than for 
the developer, who can simply raise prices on the residential sites. 
From the point of view of society, then, it is probable that greater 
costs are incurred if the Audubon Society is liable than if the devel-
oper is liable. 
4. The Welfare Effect 
When large numbers of people are involved on one side of the 
conflict, and when the initial situation is introduced as a factor, an 
additional theoretical concept comes into play. This concept is 
termed the "welfare effect". There are two theoretically correct 
methods of evaluating the subjective worth of a natural area. The 
first is the total sum of willingness of potential beneficiaries to pay 
to set aside a natural area for preservation. The second is the total 
sum that would have to be paid to all beneficiaries, in th~ event that 
they lost a natural area, to restore them to their previous level of 
welfare. Note that the difference depends upon which is the initial 
situation. Following Herfindahl and Kneese, let us take an extreme 
example: 
. . . Consider a person who has only a subsistence income, but who is 
able to enjoy the services of a wilderness area or park. If payment for 
the services were required of such a person, he could pay very little if 
anything. If, on the other hand, he were to be deprived of the services 
of the area and be compensated fully - i.e., to the extent that he would 
regard himself as well off as he was before - the compensation might 
well be larger than his actual money income.27 
Normally, the difference between the two measurements, the wel-
fare effect, may be small. But summed over a great many individu-
als, the welfare effect can be significant. It can be shown that, 
depending upon which liability rule is applied, the welfare effect can 
affect the economic outcome of the conflict.28 The welfare effect is 
relevant to this conflict because it has been the beneficiaries of the 
Sanctuary who initially suffered the loss in welfare, while the devel-
opers have achieved a gain through the imposition of the external 
effect. 
Taking note of the existence of the two factors of differing transac-
tions costs and the welfare effect, we shall consider liability relevant 
in the evaluation of the external effect. 
C. Evaluation of the External Cost 
Referring back to Section I, we will sum up the direct effect of 
drainage in the following manner: (1) it changes the character ofthe 
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Sanctuary flora and fauna through change in the hydrology, e.g. 
faster flow-through, longer dry periods, and (2) it increases the prob-
ability of fire as well as the degree of devastation of anyone fire. 
These two effects, reinforcing one another, have reduced the value 
of the Sanctuary for its beneficiaries in their subjective estimation. 
Since the Sanctuary is not a priced good we cannot establish a loss 
in value by noting a price change in the output of the Sanctuary, 
but must measure the fall in value in subjective terms. So mea-
sured, it is the sum of the minimum payments that would have to 
be paid to each of the beneficiaries of the Sanctuary, in their subjec-
tive estimation, to compensate them for the changes in the Sanc-
tuary due to the external effect. Note that the relevant measure is 
the loss in welfare to Sanctuary beneficiaries (giving them the initial 
higher position in welfare). This measure is equal to the perceived 
cost of the external effect. 
This measure is not, however, equal to the net value to society of 
the external effect, since the developer receives benefits from having 
the canal system as is, external effect notwithstanding. The devel-
oper will be willing to pay to retain the canal system, as is, a sum 
equal to the difference between the total profits with the canal 
system as is and the lower total profits after the system has been 
adjusted to diminish the external effect. This difference is equal to 
the benefits of the external effect. 
The algebraic sum of the costs (prefixed with the negative sign) 
and the benefits (prefixed with the positive sign) is equal to the net 
social value of the external effect. If the net social value is negative, 
then the external effect should be reduced; if positive, the external 
effect should not be reduced, from the point of view of the greater 
social welfare. 
At this point transactions costs become important. Suppose that 
the external effect imposes a net social cost; if transactions costs 
(including all costs of bargaining for and bringing about a change 
in the canal system) are greater than the net social cost, then effi-
ciency would dictate that it would be unwise to attempt to diminish 
the external effect, since the costs of doing so would be greater than 
the benefits. 
This position comes very close to being a rationalization of the 
status quO.29 Since transactions costs differ depending upon the lia-
bility rules, the total value of production may be greater under one 
set of rules than another. It thus becomes important to assess the 
worth of the relevant institutional and legal structures in terms of 
their capacity to facilitate conflict resolution by minimizing trans-
actions costs. Judicious placement of liability can be important in 
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this respect. Of course, a second and equally important problem is 
that of assuring that external effects are not ignored in the first 
place, but are evaluated, taking care to include in the evaluation the 
subjective loss to beneficiaries of preserved areas. 
D. The Economic Problem 
The economic problem in welfare analysis is the one of distribu-
tion of resources in production according to the value placed upon 
the goods by society. Ultimately, this involves a trade-off between 
the amount of residential development of the Golden Gate Estates 
and the amount of Sanctuary (keeping quality constant). Given the 
relative values to society of each of these land-uses at these specific 
locations, the economist will identify the problem as one of adjust-
ing the amount of the external effect so that the combined output 
of the two land-uses is maximized. This section will integrate the 
preceding elements of this chapter to give final structure to the 
problem of the Gulf American-Corkscrew Sanctuary. The following 
analysis will closely follow that set up by Ralph Turvey in his 
excellent article on divergencies between social cost and private 
cost. 30 
1. The Theoretical Problem 
Gulf American (later General Acceptance Corporation) has im-
posed an external effect on the National Audubon Society. The loss 
suffered by Sanctuary beneficiaries will depend not only upon the 
scale of Gulf American's canal system, but also upon the exact 
nature of the canal system and upon the Society's reaction to the 
drainage. For example, the external effect on the Sanctuary de-
pends not only upon the northern extent of the drainage, but upon 
the depth of the canals and the ultimate outflow of the water (Le. 
into the Gulf, a lake, or pipes to be pumped into the ground to 
recharge an aquifer), among other things. How much the Sanctuary 
will ultimately lose depends also upon how much water control de-
vices cost, the cost of dikes, pumps, wells, and other supplemental 
water sources, and the cost of assuring the woodstorks and other 
valuable species adequate substitute nesting and feeding habitat, 
among other things. Thus, to quote Turvey, 
... to ascertain the optimum resource allocation will frequently require 
an investigation of the nature and costs both of alternative activities 
open to [Gulf American] and the devices by which [the Society] can 
reduce the impact of each activity. The optimum involves that kind and 
scale of [Gulf American's] activity and that adjustment to it by [the 
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Society] which maximizes the algebraic sum of [Gulf American's] gain 
and [the Society's] loss as against the situation where [Gulf Ameri-
can] pursues no diseconomy -creating activity. 31 
2. The Theoretical Resolution 
Turvey goes on to make explicit several assumptions, namely that 
(1) both parties to the conflict are firms, (2) gains and losses can be 
measured in money t-erms, (3) both profit-maximize, (4) they are 
both able and willing to negotiate, and (5) both know of the range 
of available alternative adjustments. Given these assumptions, in 
the course of bargaining the optimum resolution should take place. 
A merger will be accomplished, if that is the least-cost route, or the 
party liable will pay for adjustments and modifications to create the 
optimal external effect. 
This is the economic problem and theoretical resolution of an 
external effect. Unfortunately, no such final resolution has taken 
place. A slight adjustment has occurred whereby the National Au-
dubon Society has acquired some land which was to be drained by 
Gulf American, thus accomplishing a partial merger. Nevertheless, 
the Society is still not satisfied with the extent of the external effect, 
and, as the party liable by default, it has exhibited a willingness-
to-pay to modify the effect, by constructing dikes, wells and pumps, 
and by acquiring land to supplement its water supply. 
We have taken as our point of view that the market process is an 
easy and effective way to resolve the economic problem as stated 
above, and that where the price mechanism fails, or where bargain-
ing fails to take place for other reasons, the minimum necessary 
adjustments in the legal and institutional framework within which 
the market operates would be the best way to assure a resolution 
approaching that which a perfectly functioning market would 
achieve. If, then, no bargaining takes place, as predicted by theory, 
it behooves the researcher first to discover why the market is failing 
to perform its function, and then to suggest how the legal and insti-
tutional framework can be adjusted. The following section will ex-
plore the reasons behind the apparent failure to achieve resolution 
through bargaining and Section V will offer suggestions as to how 
the legal-institutional framework can be adjusted. 
IV. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR MARKET FAILURE 
The preceding section described the conflict in terms of welfare 
economics, and set up a model which outlined the steps by which 
resolution theoretically ought to be achieved. Since the conflict con-
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tinues unresolved, we may either assume (1) that the external cost 
has net social benefits, i.e., that the benefits to Gulf American from 
the canal system as is are so great that the National Audubon So-
ciety could not pay them enough to diminish the effect, (2) that they 
could bribe Gulf American, but the transactions costs would out-
weigh the benefits to them of doing so, or (3) that the assumptions 
in Turvey's analysis of the problem do not hold. This section will 
describe the National Audubon Society's response to the problem, 
not only to demonstrate the ambiguities and frustrations that ac-
company actual attempts to solve problems, but to discover the 
barriers inhibiting market resolution. 
A. Net Social Benefits 
1. Measurable Costs and Observable Reaction of the National 
Audubon Society 
In order to estimate whether or not net social costs or net social 
benefits accrue from the external effect, it is necessary to gain some 
knowledge of the extent of the Sanctuary beneficiaries' willingness-
to-pay to maintain the integrity of the Sanctuary. Following 
Turvey's prescription, we will explore in detail the Society's reac-
tion to the external drainage of its water, both in terms of some of 
the measurable money costs, and in terms of the effort expended by 
Sanctuary officials to effect a resolution to their problem. The re-
sponses to the drainage threat will be given in chronological order. 
The Gee and Jenson consulting firm was hired to investigate the 
effect of drought and drainage in Corkscrew Sanctuary and to plan 
counteracting measures. Its report, issued in 1965, discounted the 
significance of Gulf American drainage and suggested that the ef-
fects of drought could be entirely mitigated by (1) a dike con-
structed across the southern border of the Sanctuary to prevent 
rapid runoff of surface water and (2) a series of wells and pumps 
designed to supplement water flow during drought. The concepts 
were not novel to the Society, but Gee and Jenson did offer a de-
tailed engineering plan. The report, plus additional specifications, 
cost the Society $11,015.21. 
The National Audubon Society strongly criticized the casual re-
search done by Gee and Jenson with respect to Gulf American 
drainage.32 While the Society partially implemented the plans as 
outlined by Gee and Jenson, they felt that they were attempting to 
protect the Sanctuary from drought effects as aggravated by 
drainage, rather than from drought effects alone. 
In December of 1964, in anticipation of the diking proposal, the 
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Society opened negotiations with Gulf American Land Corporation 
regarding Collier County Sections 28, 29, 32 and 33 of Gulf Ameri-
can holdings. Those sections contained old railroad tramways 
which, when connected, could act as an earthen dike. The land 
would also serve as a buffer zone. When it became clear that Gulf 
American would refuse to donate those sections to the Sanctuary, 
the Society indicated its desire to purchase these lands. Although 
the purchase proposal was apparently given serious consideration by 
Gulf American when negotiations opened, the Society was con-
fronted with continual postponements and breaks in negotiations. 
The Society put pressure on Gulf American to temporarily ditch its 
northern canals until weirs, as required by Collier County statute, 
were installed. As time passed, and no agreement was reached, the 
Society pleaded, without success, that it be allowed to construct the 
dike regardless of the settlement date for the transaction.33 
Internal pressure meanwhile arose to insure water supply from the 
north, partially to replace water drained from the south.34 In August 
of 1966, 1,360 acres north and east of the Sanctuary were purchased 
from First Florida Real Estate Mart. Then, in January of 1967, the 
National Audubon Society was allowed to purchase Sections 28 and 
29, at full market price. The total cost, including legal fees, insur-
ance, etc., was $687,140.84. 
Gulf American was asked to help defray costs of the dike by 
supplying heavy equipment already in use in construction of the 
Golden Gate Estates. The suggestion was eventually refused as rela-
tions deteriorated. 35 A short dike, connecting certain tramways, was 
built in 1967, but heavy rains washed it out. A second, more securely 
constructed and extensive dike was finished in 1969. The total cost 
of both was $71,740.97. Later, five wells and pumps were installed, 
to operate principally in the winter season. They were intended to 
reduce fire risk by keeping the ground moist, and to maintain the 
water level in the lettuce lakes. The cost was $62,636.22, plus 
$1,486.28 per year for electricity. 
Due to drainage of formerly wet prairies in northern Collier 
County, including extensive Gulf American drainage east of the 
Sanctuary, the feeding habitat for the woodstork has been rapidly 
diminishing in size. The fish farm project, a series of artificially 
stocked ponds with regulated water supply, was conceived and exe-
cuted with the help of a grant of $84,000.00 from the Cordelia Scaife 
May Foundation. The acquisition of the additional land cost the 
Society $182,187.00. A fish farm biologist was hired at an annual 
salary of $11,000, and the annual cost of pumping averaged 
$1,929.00. 
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The National Audubon Society pressed hard for negotiations to 
resolve the conflict. An early appeal was made to the Governor's 
Committee on Recreational Development and later to Governor 
Hayden Bums, by the President of the Society, citing the threat of 
drainage and the tourist appeal of Corkscrew Sanctuary.38 Officials 
of the Society have applied through the years to County government 
officials, particularly to the County Engineer, attempting to work 
out compromises. To a degree commensurate with its status as a 
non-profit group, the Society has tried to influence and persuade 
just as any other interest group might. Perhaps the only route not 
taken has been that of judicial relief. In the early sixties, environ-
mental legal efforts were not as pronounced as now; then the judicial 
process appeared costly, with a high risk of failure. 
2. Accounting Qualifications 
The accounting of financial costs included as part of the response 
by the National Audubon Society does not include the annual costs 
of operations and maintenance of these projects,37 which are inse-
parable from normal administration costs for the Sanctuary. The 
total annual costs of operations and maintenance in the Sanctuary 
include these project maintenance costs, costs of fire control proce-
dures, and the cost of cutting back of flammable vegetation now 
beginning to choke out more fire-resistant species. 
Complications of purpose or accounting make it impossible to 
attribute the total costs of these projects to drainage or to Gulf 
American drainage in particular. Let us recapitulate the efforts. The 
Gee and Jenson report's stated purpose was to research drought 
effects and drainage effects. Since the consulting firm did not be-
lieve that drainage had yet harmed the Sanctuary, each report rec-
ommendation was designed to mitigate drought effects alone. The 
dikes, wells, and pumps were recommended as early as 1962 by 
Walter D. BingetJ8 as a response to drought, (the explicit purpose 
was to keep the lettuce lakes wet) and partly as a long-range plan 
to conserve and develop water resources in the event that future 
drainage would affect the Sanctuary. Both Binger and Davis,39 who 
investigated the Sanctuary's drought problem jointly, were optimis-
tic that the Sanctuary would not suffer from such external effects. 
The fish farm project was first suggested by Alexander Sprunt. 
Later Phil Kahl, noted woodstork expert, commented that the fish 
farm would be for the woodstorks whose "feeding areas are sure to 
be drained eventually."40 Although the need for the fish farm grew 
entirely out of the drainage, it was not made necessary by Gulf 
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American drainage alone. Finally, the land acquisitions were justi-
fied to provide land for the dikes, the costs of which, as stated above, 
are not fully attributable to Gulf American drainage. Therefore, the 
cost of land acquisition is not fully attributable to Gulf American 
drainage. 
The ambiguity and complexity of the cost data is the natural 
result of dealing with an open system. Many pressures are acting 
upon the Sanctuary - drought, the threat of mineral extraction, 
pesticide and fertilizer runoff, drainage from all sides. In an interde-
pendent world, any response will have several motives and multiple 
purposes. A calculation of the exact resource costs expended by the 
National Audubon Society, i.e. exact damages attributable to Gulf 
American (later General Acceptance) drainage alone is conceivable; 
it can only be made, however, when (1) the damage to the Sanctuary 
from dry seasons and periodic drought is separated from the damage 
caused by drainage, (2) the damage caused by Gulf American drain-
age is separated from damage, or threatened damage, from other 
sources impinging upon Sanctuary water supply, (3) the National 
Audubon Society makes explicit and separate in its accounting the 
clear and provable costs it must incur as response to external effects. 
3. Evaluation of the External Effect 
Such an accounting of the exact damages incurred by the Na-
tional Audubon Society, while serving the purposes of the court as 
damages, would not yet be a true estimate of the external cost of 
Gulf American drainage. External effects can only be evaluated 
when all possible alternative adjustments are known by both sides, 
and the willingness-to-pay and required compensation of the liable 
and non-liable parties are known. The National Audubon Society 
has been working under a severe disadvantage in not being able to 
confer with Gulf American about possible alternative adjustments. 
For example, had communication been possible, it might have been 
discovered that installing several weirs at certain points in the canal 
would have been the least expensive method of mitigating the exter-
nal effect to everyone's satisfaction. There may be many other possi-
bilities, but this example is suggestive of the type of ignorance under 
which both parties have been laboring in the absence of communica-
tion. 
In the absence of knowledge of the cost of alternative adjustments 
that might be made to mitigate the effect, the best estimate of the 
external cost remains the amount of compensation that must be 
paid to Sanctuary beneficiaries to have them tolerate the external 
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effect. Pragmatically, no such objective estimate can be made, al-
though, as noted before, such compensation should be extremely 
high since the Sanctuary is unique and irreplaceable, and the num-
ber of beneficiaries is many. As an alternative, we might try to 
determine the willingness-to-pay of Sanctuary beneficiaries to miti-
gate the effect,41 
The solicitations for the projects cited above all named drainage 
from the south as the cause of damage to the Sanctuary. All contri-
butors understood that their contributions were going to defend the 
Sanctuary from drainage. Therefore, we are able to state that the 
costs thus far expended by the Sanctuary show that the Sanctuary 
beneficiaries have been willing to pay at least $1,281,021.24 in capi-
tal costs and $14,415.30 in yearly operating expenses to preserve the 
Sanctuary's integrity. There has been no hint that the solicited flow 
of funds into the National Audubon Society for the Sanctuary is 
drying up, that willingness-to-pay has reached the bottom of the 
barrel. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that an 
environment-conscious public will place increasing value on Cork-
screw Sanctuary, and other sanctuaries similar to it. Moreover, this 
is only a partial tally of contributors' willingness-to-pay. If quasi-
public groups such as the National Audubon Society were to be 
encouraged by the government (see Section V), more of the free-
rider effect might be overcome, and more demand for the Sanctuary 
would be registered. 
We do not have the costs that would have accrued to Gulf Ameri-
can (now to General Acceptance Corporation), to weigh against the 
willingness-to-pay of the Society, to determine if the Society could 
pay the developer to adjust the canal system, or to not extend it. It 
is reasonable to assume, however, that given the dramatic response 
of contributors so far, the Society could pay the developer to make 
at least marginal adjustments in his plans. It is evidence for this 
assumption that the National Audubon Society, although refused, 
was willing to pay the full market price for Sections 32 and 33, as 
well as 28 and 29, on Gulf American's terms. 
B. Excessive Transactions Costs 
The second possible reason why the market has failed to function 
properly is that, even if there were net social costs from the external 
effect, the transactions costs would outweigh the gains from correct-
ing the external effect. More simply, it wouldn't be worth the effort 
to correct the external effect. 
Given that liability currently rests with the National Audubon 
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Society, we recognize, referring to Section II, that the transactions 
costs of capturing willingness-to-pay will be particularly high be-
cause of the free-rider effect. The balance of transactions costs 
would go toward overcoming the reluctance of those individuals to 
contribute who realize that they would receive the full benefit of 
others' contributions even if they do not themselves contribute. It 
is the special function of a quasi-public group such as the National 
Audubon Society to diminish these transactions costs. If such or-
ganizations did not exist, those individuals who took it upon them-
selves to find sufficient contributors would normally discover the 
cost and effort to be prohibitive. 
The Society made public the information that the Sanctuary was 
threatened with drainage, then solicited from membership lists (all 
potential beneficiaries), lists of former contributors (known benefi-
ciaries), and, through the Audubon News Release, to other organiza-
tions and the public. Its solicitation sounded the alarm and was 
persuasive in tone, assuring each potential contributor that his con-
tribution, however small, would be significant. The beneficiary re-
ceived in return for his contribution a signed print by a famous bird 
artist,42 a tax deduction, and the satisfaction of having helped to 
rescue Corkscrew Sanctuary. In this manner the public was made 
aware of the threatened loss in welfare and beneficiaries were lo-
cated, identified, and converted to benefactors. All this was accom-
plished at a cost smaller than would have been incurred by individ-
uals without access to the lists of potential beneficiaries-benefactors 
and the special resources (e.g. newsletters) of conservation organiza-
tions. 
Part of these transactions costs are attributed to the resource cost 
of each project. The Society keeps under the account of, for exam-
ple, the land acquisitions, the costs of solicitation and legal fees for 
contracts. Apparently, then, given its willingness to purchase 
Sections 32 and 33 as well as 28 and 29 from Gulf American, the 
Society believed that it could raise enough funds, net of transactions 
costs, to consummate the larger purchase. Certainly the high trans-
actions costs reduce the likelihood of a full registering of willingness-
to-pay on the part of all beneficiaries, and thus prevent a perfectly 
efficient resolution of the external effect by the market. But given 
the dramatic response by contributors to National Audubon Society 
solicitations for help with drainage,43 and the eagerness with which 
the Society has attempted to bring Gulf American to the negotiating 
table, the observer is left in a position to doubt that it is high 
transactions costs alone which account for the failure of some kind 
of market resolution. 
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C. Failure of the Assumptions of the Model 
The third possible answer to non-resolution by the market is that 
at least one of Turvey's assumptions does not hold. To recapitulate, 
these assumptions are that: (1) both parties to the conflict are firms, 
(2) gains and losses can be measured in money terms, (3) both are 
profit-maximizing, (4) both are able and willing to negotiate, and 
(5) the available alternatives and adjustments are known. The con-
flict is remarkable in that no single assumption is entirely true for 
this c"ase: 
(1) The developers have each been firms producing marketable 
commodities. The National Audubon Society is not a firm; it is a 
quasi-public group producing a good (the Sanctuary) exhibiting 
strong collective consumption characteristics, and the products of 
which are therefore not marketable. 
(2) The gains and losses to Gulf American and General Accept-
ance Corporation may easily be measured in money terms. Gains 
and losses are reflected in fluctuations in costs of inputs to produc-
tion, and in value of residential sites. The loss to the Sanctuary may 
be evaluated only indirectly in money terms. The direct loss is dam-
age to the Sanctuary ecosystem. The final evaluation of the loss is 
willingness-to-pay. This is a subjective estimation on the part of 
each beneficiary, an estimation which could be overstated, if the 
beneficiary believes that he will not have to follow through with 
actual payment, or understated if the beneficiary believes he will 
have to make payment and is subject to the free-rider effect. 
(3) The third assumption is that both parties are profit-
maximizing. The National Audubon Society has only one general 
objective: to keep the Sanctuary preserved, its integrity 
undamaged, indefinitely. As noted previously, the Society does not 
set user fees to profit-maximize. Indeed the Society is explicitly a 
non-profit organization. Since financial profits are not its objective, 
it is not likely to be willing to accept money payments as compensa-
tion for loss of the Sanctuary ecosystem, or for loss of the woodstork 
colony. The necessary compensation will be extremely high since 
the Sanctuary ecosystem is unique and irreplaceable. This makes 
compromise more difficult. Compromise is most likely then to cen-
ter around land acquisitions, water control devices, and so on, 
rather than compensatory payments. 
There are several possible significant questions regarding the 
profit-maximizing of the owners of the development. During nego-
tiations, Gulf American was involved in serious legal difficulties in 
several states. Theory does not account for the fact that attention 
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may be diverted from profit maximizing when corporate survival is 
at issue. This may account for the long delays and breaks in negotia-
tion. In addition, some development companies are not interested 
in long-term, but in short-term, cut-and-run profits. With these 
companies, subtle reallocations to marginally improve profits are 
overlooked; concentration is entirely upon rapid sales, until all lots 
are sold, whereupon the company departs, leaving the community 
to pay for sewer hook-ups and street lighting.44 If the charges made 
about Gulf American are true, then it may be true that the develop-
ment company suffered from such tunnel vision. A third question 
regarding profit-maximizing outside of the theoretical world con-
cerns the efficiency of businesses belonging to large conglomerates, 
such as the General Acceptance Corporation. Because of the com-
plexity of institutional financial structures and tax regulations, 
some of the separate businesses run by conglomerates may purpose-
fully be run inefficiently. We are all aware that conglomerates may 
buy failing businesses for tax advantages. Other businesses may be 
acquired to be bled of revenues, regardless of the long-term disad-
vantages to that particular business. The efficiency of conglomer-
ates has been challenged on the basis that efficiency decreases as 
hierarchy increases. As decision-making becomes increasingly more 
remote from the day-to-day operations of the business, the finer 
adjustments of resource reallocation may be lost from sight. Nego-
tiation with the Society might have proven profitable for the Gen-
eral Acceptance Corporation or Gulf American, but the decision-
makers might have been so remote as to be indifferent. 
(4) With reference to Turvey's fourth assumption, i.e. that both 
parties are able and willing to negotiate, the land development com-
pany may be not only indifferent, but actually reluctant to negotiate 
explicitly about external effects if its officials fear that negotiation 
would be an implicit admission of responsibility for the external 
effect. So far, both Gulf American and the General Acceptance 
Corporation have at the same time dismissed the existence of, and 
disclaimed responsibility for, the external effect. With overt recog-
nition, the owners of Golden Gate Estates might run the risk of 
being recognized as partially liable for the damages. In the face of 
indifference, or even reluctance, on the part of one party, Turvey's 
fourth assumption loses validity. Where one party does not wish to 
bargain, however much it may be to his advantage, no market trans-
action will take place. 
(5) The fifth assumption, that of knowledge of alternative ad-
justments, fails with the fourth assumption in this case. Where 
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there has been no negotiation, lack of communication will sustain 
ignorance of the range of alternatives which might mitigate the 
external effect. 
D. A Conclusion 
We have explored three possibilities as to why negotiation and 
bargaining have not taken place. The first two possibilities appear 
to be ruled out by the evidence that Sanctuary beneficiaries have 
been'willing to pay over $1,000,000, in capital expenses, so far; that 
they offered to purchase mQre land from Gulf American but were 
refused; and that the flow of willingness-to-pay has reached no ob-
servable limits. Ultimately, it comes down to intransigence on the 
part of the developers. For internal reasons not associated with 
profit-maximizing the developer has not come to the bargaining 
table. 
Nor do Collier County attitudes encourage the developer to nego-
tiate. There is the strong conviction among many landowners in the 
region that "this is still one part of the country in which a man may 
exercise his rights of private ownership in land. "45 There is the desire 
of County officials to promote the wealth of the once predominantly 
poor county. In these calculations of wealth, intangibles and bene-
fits to those outside of the County are not seriously considered. 
Development appears to be the surest way to increase the wealth of 
the County, by increasing its tax rolls. Relatively recently opened 
up, Collier County retains something of the pioneer ethic, which 
seeks to tame rather than protect nature. Finally, as one County 
Commissioner48 admitted, the Sanctuary is not familiar to the in-
habitants of Naples, and is not therefore considered a collective 
good of the County itself. The institutions of County government 
have no incentive to take into account the demand of Corkscrew 
beneficiaries not in the County when making administrative land-
use decisions, but these institutions do encourage private develop-
ment which would tangibly increase the wealth of the County. 
We know that because the Sanctuary exhibits collective con-
sumption characteristics and solicitations are subject to the free-
rider effect, the market will never resolve the external effect in a 
perfectly efficient way. But there is no reason why a firm should 
produce an external effect, and then refuse to bargain so as to dim-
inish the effect on another party, if it can do so without cost to itself. 
When bargaining such as this takes place, at least one party is 
better off without making the other worse off, and possibly both 
parties are better off. Such bargaining should be encouraged to take 
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place; if encouragement is not to come from the County level, then 
it should come from higher levels of the government. If the National 
Audubon Society is to effect a resolution of the problem, it may have 
to work indirectly through County, State and national levels of gov-
ernment, the administrative, legislative and judicial sectors, to de-
velop an environment not only conducive, but inducive, to bargain-
ing to reduce external effects. 
v. ADJUSTMENTS IN THE LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
MARKET 
A. Need For Adjustment 
At the time when the cypress trees in Corkscrew Swamp were on 
the verge of being cut and transported north, preservation interest 
in establishing a sanctuary was high. Despite this avowed interest, 
in spite furthermore of being offered the land as a donation, the 
State of Florida refused to intervene to preserve the cypress. No 
individual stepped forward to undertake responsibility for purchas-
ing and managing what was to become Corkscrew· Sanctuary. It 
remained for a non-profit preservation group, the National Audu-
bon Society, to acquire the land with contributions received from 
its membership and from other interested individuals across the 
nation. The Society did not find it difficult. There are untold num-
bers of citizens who are willing to pay for preservation, but these 
citizens have very limited ways of individually expressing their 
demands. They may vote on the use of their taxes for preservation, 
but they find that they are not often given clear-cut choices between 
preservation and development in the ballot-box. Fewer times still 
do they receive the chance to vote for preserving a piece of land they 
especially value. As consumers, their individual willingness-to-pay 
is usually not sufficient to purchase and set aside their favorite 
natural area. When it comes to lobbying or paying for a good they 
do not consume exclusively, the natural inclination is to let others 
spend the effort. The most consistently effective way that individu-
als have of expressing their collective demand for provision of pre-
served areas is by membership in a group which both solicits their 
contributions and focuses their demand. 
In the private market place, it is the natural propensity of the 
profit-maximizing land owner to sell or convert his land to that use 
which pays him the greatest dividends in money. Most land-use 
decisions are made in the market place. Therefore, in the absence 
of sufficient quasi-public groups to register demand for preservation 
by outright purchase, a large measure of willingness-to-pay on the 
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part of the public will be ignored, and there will be a natural bias 
on market land-use decisions toward development. 
Once a sanctuary such as Corkscrew is established, those same 
collective good problems continue to plague preservation. When 
development arose around Corkscrew Sanctuary, it was almost in-
evitable that that development would produce· external effects, in 
this case, drainage, which would harm the natural ecosystem. 
Again, however, because the owners were a quasi-public group, they 
have· been able to command a sum of willingness-to-pay which 
ought to have effected mitigation of the influence of drainage. Other 
problems, this time not naturally of the market, intervened, and the 
developer refused to negotiate to diminish the external effect. 
Despite current problems, the beneficiaries of Corkscrew Sanc-
tuary have been relatively fortunate in having been able to preserve 
so far this unique ecosystem. In innumerable other areas, land and 
other resources have been diverted away from preservation in spite 
of palpable demand, either because there was no quasi-public pres-
ervation group to purchase the land, or because, once purchased, 
the market did not respond properly to correct external effects, and 
the preserved area was lost through pollution, drainage, loss ofnatu-
ral wildlife, or other damage. 
It is part of the function of the government to see that the nation's 
scarce resources are allocated according to the relative demands of 
the citizenry. Where it perceives that the market is allocating im-
properly, or where questions of equity override economic issues, it 
is the role of the government to modify the rules of the game. 
Given that an increasingly large segment of an environment-
conscious public is coming to value preserved natural areas, and 
given that the only way consumers can effectively register that de-
mand is through quasi-public preservation groups which focus indi-
vidual demands, it is the responsibility of the government to aid and 
encourage those preservation groups to correct the market bias 
against preservation. 
The market system operates within a framework of property 
rights and contracts, and institutions to arbitrate and enforce rights 
and contracts. Operating through the three sectors of government, 
the legislative, judicial, and administrative, there are numerous 
ways in which preservation interests might seek to adjust this legal-
institutional framework so as to give preservation demand a vote in 
land-use decisions commensurate with its willingness-to-pay. 
B. Prohibition 
Prohibition is the crudest method of bringing about adequate 
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provision of preserved areas or a resolution of external effects. It is 
the most likely method to create a host of external effects for each 
one it prohibits. Nevertheless, on occasion, it is necessary where the 
value to the public of a natural area is very high and there is vir-
tually no mechanism through which demand can be registered or 
external effects can be mitigated in time to prevent development. 
Prohibition of development, or of certain external effects associated 
with development, can be most effective when used judiciously 
within a long-range land-use plan. 
C. Regulations 
Under the heading "Regulations" are subsumed all ofthe policies, 
programs, laws, statutes, and regulations promulgated by the ad-
ministrative and legislative branches at all levels and sectors of 
government which might bear directly or indirectly upon allocation 
ofland, private or public, toward preservation. Very often the regu-
lations having the most allocative significance are indirectly rele-
vant to preservation. Let us take for example laws concerning the 
use of groundwater, because these laws are indirectly relevant to 
Corkscrew Sanctuary. 
Groundwater comes from a common pool, commonly owned. It is 
an economic dictum that a common property resource is scarce to 
the community, but free to the individual. The individual user, one 
such as Golden Gate Estates, treats groundwater as if it were of no 
value, and lets it run freely into the sea. 47 The Florida Water Re-
sources Act of 197248 has partially overcome this problem by abolish-
ing all riparian rights and requiring permits for water use, even for 
groundwater use. These permits must be renewed every two years. 
There are "specific provisions for the management of ground water 
basin for recharge of aquifers." The new law is very flexible, and 
gives a great deal of responsibility to water management districts, 
one of which Corkscrew Sanctuary was invited to join several years 
ago. This new law could be the basis for a possible damage suit 
against General Acceptance Corporation. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the creation of water manage-
ment districts may be a way to provide the Society with a voice in 
County water management, without incurring the danger of losing 
the tax-exempt status it now enjoys, since its voice would be that 
of a property owner. Through this forum the National Audubon 
Society could attempt to force provisions requiring compromise 
with neighbors with reference to any land-use having external ef-
fects. Even if a change in liability is not possible, just forcing the 
General Acceptance Corporation to the negotiating table would 
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serve the purpose of fostering knowledge of the costs and benefits 
of the current system, and the range of alternative adjustments 
available. The Society has the option of closely inspecting County, 
State and Federal statutes regulating water management directly or 
indirectly, with the view toward taking a case before the courts, or 
toward influencing future shifts in the law. 
D. Land-Use Management 
Up· to now the Society has relied on technology to protect the 
Sanctuary from harm. It se.ems apparent to all, including many 
within the Society, that this course of action has strong limitations. 
In the end it may not suffice. Moreover it could be among the most 
costly of the alternatives available. It is difficult to imagine how the 
Sanctuary could effectively isolate its own sub-system from the 
larger hydrological system of the County. It may well be a more 
productive use of the National Audubon Society's resources to force 
the County to realize the value of the Corkscrew Swamp and Marsh 
as a County asset, not only in terms of its aesthetic value, but its 
value as a water collecting and groundwater recharging area. The 
Board of County Commissioners has in its hands a Report on Water 
Management in Collier County, Florida, which emphasizes that the 
"significance of these natural areas [including Corkscrew Sanc-
tuary] cannot be overestimated. Collier County's attraction de-
pends on their lure, and as time goes by they will become priceless 
assets."49 The Report stated that rainfall is the only source for re-
charge of groundwater; in its turn groundwater provides 90 percent 
of the water supply for the County population. Surface water is lost 
by evaporation or runoff. "Deep channels of this nature without 
weirs lower the water table in many areas, with dangerous conse-
quences."50 Irrigation use of groundwater is already great (in 1961) 
"but will reach staggering proportions in the future." The Report 
goes on to record in more detail the need to conserve and recharge 
groundwater. Even if the County government has not acted on these 
recommendations, the needs have been made public and are avail-
able for public review. The large consumptive use of groundwater 
for irrigation suggests that farmers and ranchers should join forces 
with the Society in forcefully advocating County land management 
of recharge areas such as the Sanctuary. Advocates might capitalize 
on the threat of salt-water intrusion in Naples to publicly call, not 
only for management of withdrawal, already accomplished, but 
management of supply. 
Wherever possible, laws and regulations which aid and encourage 
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preservation group involvement in land-use management should be 
enacted. This issue is a particularly significant one calling for con-
certed effort for all interested preservation groups. 
E. Taxes and Subsidies 
Looking beyond the immediate problem, it is probable that seri-
ous external effects will plague most sanctuaries and parks eventu-
ally. On a national level, preservation groups might wish to support 
a policy calling for additional taxes on development which causes 
harm to designated natural areas.51 The tax should be designed so 
that the developer will, in effect, take social costs, rather than only 
private costs, into account when allocating its own resources. Alter-
natively, subsidies to preservation groups would help defray some 
of the transactions costs of identifying and soliciting contributions. 
Especially advantageous would be tax-free status for groups lobby-
ing for preservation.52 
F. Judicial Review 
As mentioned above, the possibility of judicial review of privately 
produced external effects exists because of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act and because of the nuisance law, or the law of 
torts. This law is still inadequate where injuries are collectively 
consumed and the effect on anyone person is small,53 in part be-
cause of standing problems. Beneficiaries of the Sanctuary are for-
tunate in having as its owner a group which is only quasi-public, 
which owns the land in its private capacity, and has the right to sue 
in that capacity of landowner. For other public interest groups, 
which do not own land, this standing is sometimes more difficult to 
achieve. The legal adjuncts of environmental groups have long been 
pressing for reform in the civil law to correct this situation. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As Collier County continues to develop, and land-uses begin to 
crowd one another, the occurrence of external effects will increase. 
Corkscrew Sanctuary, like all sanctuaries, parks, and other natural 
areas in a development context, will have many different types of 
interdependencies with which to contend. Corkscrew Sanctuary will 
soon feel the external effects of drainage from development to the 
east and west. The possibility of a polluted or enriched water source, 
whether from runoff or groundwater sources, exists wherever ferti-
lizer and chemicals are used to protect truck farm or citrus prod-
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ucts, as on the land abutting the Sanctuary's northern boundary. 
The prospect of long-term climatic changes from drainage of wet-
lands and large-scale clearing is in the offing. If Collier County 
becomes urbanized, noise and commotion surrounding the Sanc-
tuary could make it unattractive to wildlife. The Sanctuary could 
even suffer external effects from mineral extraction. 
There are many options open to preservation groups who wish to 
effect changes in the legal and institutional structure of the market 
so as to give preservation interests a better position in the allocative 
process. In their role as quasi-public groups, preservation groups 
might actively advocate and lobby for changes such as those out-
lined above. For those groups, such as the National Audubon So-
ciety, who are in addition proprietors of natural areas, there is the 
added option of working at the local level to integrate the sub-
ecosystem of the natural area into a larger inclusive system under 
regional control. 
It is apparent that preservation is a continuous and difficult pro-
cess. Those who wish to maintain the integrity of a sanctuary must 
contend both with "normal" natural disasters and with man-made 
influences threatening the delicate balance of the preserved ecosys-
tem. Preservation efforts are continually hampered by characteris-
tics common to situations of market failure, so the full demand for 
preservation does not register in the market place. This bias against 
preservation values can be corrected by adjustments in the legal-
institutional context in which the market operates, adjustments 
which aid and encourage preservation groups to register demand in 
the town hall, the courts, and in the market place. 
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